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  INTRODUCTION 
  Although much has been written on the theory of auctions, most of this work focuses 
exclusively on the symmetric equilibrium of an auction in which bidders are ex ante the same in 
the sense that the joint distribution of buyers’ types is symmetric.  In previous work (Maskin and 
Riley (2000a and 2000b), we have begun exploring the theory in the absence of symmetry. 
1  
Specifically we have examined (i) the existence of equilibrium in a sealed high-bid auction and 
(ii) the differences between the equilibrium in high-bid and second-price auctions when buyers 
are asymmetric ex ante. 
  Here we turn to the question of uniqueness.  With a symmetric distribution of types, it is 
well known that there is only one symmetric equilibrium (Milgrom and Weber, 1982, Maskin 
and Riley, 1984).  However, it is not implausible to conjecture that, even in an ex ante symmetric 
setting, a particular buyer might establish a reputation as an aggressive bidder if it is in his 
interest to do so.  Riley (1980) provides an example of the "war of attrition" in which this is 
indeed the case.  In fact, there is a continuum of asymmetric equilibria in which one buyer bids 
"aggressively" and the other "passively."  Furthermore, the greater the degree of aggression, the 
larger is the equilibrium expected gain of the aggressive buyer.   
  A second example of a continuum of equilibria occurs in a pure common-values setting, if 
the item is sold by open ascending bid.  As first noted by Milgrom (1981) there is always a 
continuum of equilibria in the two-buyer case.  Bikchandani and Riley (1991) also present an 
example in which, with n bidders, there is a continuum of equilibria. 
 
                                                           
1 There is also a literature on efficient auctions (see Maskin, 2003, for a survey) that eschews the 
symmetry assumption. 
  1  For the symmetric high-bid auction with private values, however, we show that there can 
be no asymmetric equilibrium under the assumption that reservation prices are drawn 
independently from a distribution with finite support
2 and positive mass at the lower endpoint.
3  
That is, equilibrium is unique. 
  When we drop the symmetry assumption, uniqueness continues to obtain under same 
assumptions if there are only 2 buyers.  For more than two buyers, we need the additional fairly 
mild assumptions that buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences, that 
absolute risk aversion is nonincreasing, and that the supports of the different buyers’ 
distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint.   
  The argument that equilibrium is unique is basically an application of the fundamental 
theorem of ordinary differential equations (FTODE).  As we will see, the major problems with 
applying this theorem are (i) ensuring that buyers’ (inverse) bid functions are differentiable, so 
that they satisfy a system of differential equations; and (ii) establishing that there exists a unique 
“boundary condition” for that system. 
  We describe the model in section 1.  In section 2 we present characterization results.  We 





                                                           
2 If the support of the distribution is unbounded, we conjecture that there will be a continuum of 
asymmetric equilibria. 
3 This latter assumption is weak because it is satisfied automatically if the seller sets a reserve price that 
is even marginally above the lowest possible buyer reservation price. 
  21.  THE MODEL 
 
  Throughout we shall make the following assumptions about the auction and the buyers 
participating in it.  A single item is to be sold to the buyer who makes the highest non-negative 
sealed bid.  If two or more bids tie, the winner is selected at random from among the high 
bidders.  There are  n  potential buyers.  Buyer i of type  obtains utility 0 if he loses and utility  
 if he wins with a bid of  b,  where U  is twice continuously differentiable.  We assume 
that 
i s
(, ) ii Ub s i










Without loss of generality, we can interpret   as buyer i’s  reservation price.  Hence 
.  Buyer i's reservation price is drawn independently from a distribution with 
support  
i s
() , ii i Us s= 0
[, , where  ] i i ss 0, i s >   and c.d.f.  .  We assume that   is twice continuously 
differentiable, that its derivative is strictly positive on  
() ⋅ i F i F
[, , and that  ] i i ss () 0 i i Fs >  (see 
footnote 3). 
  Clearly it is a dominated strategy for a buyer to bid more than his reservation price.  
Hence, we will rule this out by assumption. 
Assumption 1:  Bidder i never bids more than his reservation price   in equilibrium.  i s
If a buyer i has a negative reservation price, then it is a dominated strategy for him to bid at all, 
and so without loss of generality we can assume that  0. i s ≥  
  3 
Let  Π  be the probability that bidder i wins.  Then his expected utility is   i
 
(, ) ii i EU b =Π i s .   
 
We shall assume throughout that the higher is a bidder's reservation price, the ''flatter'' are his 
indifference curves in bid-probability space.  That is, the single-crossing property holds
4.  Given 
our assumptions, bidder i's indifference curve, are as depicted in Figure 1.1.  Specifically, at  



















Thus, for single-crossing, we require the following assumption. 










 is a decreasing function of  .  i s
 
Note that if U  takes the form Ub  then Assumption 2 is satisfied provided that 
bidder i is risk-neutral or risk-averse, i.e., V  
i () ( ) , iii i s Vs b =−
0. i′′ ≤
,
                                                           
4 In technical terms, this is the assumption that utility is log supermodular. 
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Figure 1.1:  Single-crossing property 
 
As we shall see in section 3, it will be helpful to define the "log cost" of having to bid to 
win the item, rather than getting it gratis: 
 












,           ( 1 . 2 )  
 
and so Assumption 2 is equivalent to the assumption that the marginal log cost is lower for 
higher reservation prices.  Given this assumption, buyer i’s bidding behavior will be monotonic 
in   (see Lemma 2 below).  i s
  5Since it will be useful below, we note that 
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i  is buyer i's coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  Note that as long 
as a buyer is risk neutral or risk averse (and hence  ),   is strictly convex for 
all 
(, ) 0 ii Abs ≥ ( , ) ii cb s
[ ) 0, i bs .  ∈
 
2.  CHARACTERIZING THE EQUILIBRIUM BID FUNCTIONS 
From Maskin and Riley (2000a and b) we have the following two results: 
 
Lemma 1:  If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the distribution of winning bids in equilibrium has a 
support consisting of an interval [,  and a c.d.f.   which is continuous on  (,  (see 
Proposition 3 of Maskin and Riley (2000b)). 
*




Lemma 2: Monotonicity 
If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then if bs is a best response  by buyer i with reservation price 
 to the other buyers’ bidding strategies, it is non-decreasing in   (see Proposition 1 of Maskin 
and Riley (2000a)). 
() ii
i s i s
 
  6  To understand Lemma 2 geometrically, consider Figure 1.1.  If   is optimal for a 
buyer with reservation price  , there can be no feasible alternatives in the heavily shaded 
region. Thus, any alternatives preferred to  by the higher reservation price   must lie in 
the lightly shaded region, i.e., they must entail higher bids. 
(, ) b′ ′ Π
s′
( , ) b′ ′ Π s′′
  As our first preliminary result, we characterize   ,  the lower endpoint of the support of 
the distribution of winning bids. 
* b
Lemma 3: Characterization of the minimum winning bid 
Without loss of generality, suppose that  1 ... n s ≤≤ s .  If Assumption 1 and 2 hold, then the 
minimum bid satisfies 
              2* . s ≤≤ 1 sb    (2.1) 
 
Furthermore, if  21 , ss <  then  
             *1 1 max argmax ( ) ( , ) i i b
F b
≠ =× 1 U b s b    (2.2) 
Proof:  Suppose first that  1 s ∗ > b .  Consider a buyer with reservation price  11
1 22 ˆ (, ss b b ∗ ∗ ∈+ ) .  
Because s , the lowest winning bid, the buyer has an equilibrium expected payoff of zero.  
But there is a positive probability that all other buyers have reservation prices less than 
ˆ b ∗ <
1
1 2 s + 1
2 b ∗ .  Thus, from Assumption 1, our buyer has a strictly positive payoff if he bids 
1
1 2 s + 1
2 b ∗ , a contradiction.  We conclude that  .  1 bs ∗ ≤
  Suppose next that  2 s ∗ <
∗
b .  From Lemma 1, there are no mass points on  .  Thus, 
buyers 1 and 2, regardless of their reservation prices, have strictly positive expected payoffs 




{ } buyer   bids   or more bility 1 , Ii i b ∗ =     with proba  
  7then 1,2 I ∈ .  For all iI  be the probability that buyer  .  If, for all  , 
then bidding b  results in a tie with positive probability.  Thus, buyer 1 is strictly better off 
bidding slightly above b , since this increases his probability of winning discontinuously.  
Hence, for some  .  If  , then buyer 1’s probability of winning, and hence his 
expected utility, is approximately zero for bids near b .  But we have already argued that buyer 
1’s equilibrium expected utility is strictly positive, a contradiction.  Hence,  .  But now the 
same contradiction pertains to buyer 2.  We conclude that (2.1) holds. 
, let  i p ∈
∗
, 0 i p ∈ =
bids  i ∗ b , 0 i iI p ∈>
∗
iI 1 i ≠
∗
1 0 p =





() ) 1 11 U ∗ ×
()
Fb U





11 s > b '
 Suppose  that  s . From Assumption 1, if buyer 1 with reservation price  ∗ , 




  () ( 1 11 ,, ii ii b s Fb bs ∗ ≠≠ ×≤  for all b. 
Hence, 
  11 i1 arg max , bF b
≠ ∈× . 
  Finally, suppose that both b  and    solve this maximization problem and that   .  
Buyer 1  with reservation price 
" b '" bb <
 weakly prefers b  to any lower bid.  Given Assumption 2, all 
other buyer 1  types strictly prefer    to any lower bid.  Thus the minimum bid for all 
reservation prices s  is at least   .  But then  b   is not the lower endpoint of the support of 
the equilibrium distribution of winning bids.  We conclude that (2.2) holds. 
"
                                                                                                            Q.E.D.  
  8 
Lemma 4:  Strict monotonicity of the probability of winning: 
  Suppose that    and that b are in the support of the distribution of winning 
bids in equilibrium.  Then at least two buyers bid in the interval  (  with positive 
probability. 
bb ′ < ′ ′ b ′ ′
)
and  ′
, bb ′′ ′
Proof:  From Lemma 1, the support of G  is connected, and so all the bids in the interval 
 are also in the support.  This implies that at least one buyer bids in   with positive 
probability.  Suppose, contradicting the Lemma, that buyer i is the only one to do so.  
Specifically, assume that for reservation price   buyer i bids   in equilibrium.  But 
buyer i can reduce his bid to b  without diminishing his probability of winning, a 
contradiction. 
( ) w b
() , b b ′′ ′
( , bb ′′ ′ ) )
)
s
( , bb ′ ′ ′
i s ( ˆ , bb b ′ ′ ′ ∈
ˆ ε −∈
                                                                                                                                Q.E.D. 
Let  (  be equilibrium bidding strategies (possibly mixed strategies).  Because 
 is continuous, any deterministic selection    from    is strictly increasing at all  
 for which bs .  It follows that 





( ) ii bs () ii bs 
* b
              
1 () () ii yb
− ⋅= ⋅ 
is a nondecreasing function that is well defined at all b   for which there exists   with  
.  Thus, for all b   we can define 
* b > i s
supp ( ) ii bb ∈ 
* b >
 
         .        ( 2 . 3 )   ˆˆ ˆ ( ) sup{ ( )| , ( ) defined} iii by b b b y b φ =≤
  9 
Because     is nondecreasing,  ( ) i y ⋅ ( ) i φ ⋅  is nondecreasing and continuous for all  b .  Note, 
furthermore, that buyer i’s probability of winning can be written as 
* b >
 
  () ( () ) ij j ji Gb F b φ
≠ ≡× .          ( 2 . 4 )  
 
Because   ( ) j b φ   is continuous for all  j,  so is   .  Any realization of bs solves  ( ) i Gb () ii 
max ( , ) max ( ( )) ( , ) ii j j ii ji bb
Eb s F bUb s φ
≠ =× . 
Equivalently, it solves: 
 
(, )
max ( ( ))
(0, )
ii






That is, the bidder maximizes the ratio of his expected utility to his utility if he is simply given 
the item for free.   
 
Define   
 
 ( ) log  ( ( )) ii i p bF b φ ≡ .          ( 2 . 5 )  
  10 
Then, any realization of   solves  () ii bs 




(, )  l o g  [ ( () ) ] () (, )
(0, )
ii
ii j j j i ji
ji ii
Ub s





=× = − ∑ i , 
and  cb  is given by (1.1).  ( , ) ii s
 




≠ ∑ .  Proofs of Lemmas 5-8 can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Lemma 5:  Strict monotonicity property of bid distributions. 
For any b  and any i,  b ∗ > ( ) j
ji
p b
≠ ∑  is strictly increasing at b. 
 
Lemma 6:  If   ( ) i b φ  is strictly increasing to the right or left at  bb ,  then     is a best 
response for buyer i with reservation price  .  
ˆ b ∗ =≥ ˆ b
ˆ ˆ () ii sb φ =
 
Lemma 7:  If   ( ) i b φ  is strictly increasing to the right or to the left at  bb , then   * ˆ b =≥ ( ) j
ji
p b
≠ ∑   
is correspondingly right or left continuously differentiable at  b .  Moreover, the right or left 
derivative satisfies 
ˆ










∂ ∑ b         ( 2 . 6 )  
  11 
Lemma 8: ( ) i b φ   is right or left continuously differentiable at all  b  .  * b ≥
Define the inverse function 
 
  . (2.7)  ()
1
() l og () ii hF
−
⋅≡ ⋅
Then we can rewrite equation (2.6) as  
 
  () () () () ,. ji i i
ji
pb c b h p b
b ≠
∂ ′ =
∂ ∑   (2.8) 
  We shall make important use of the following: 
Lemma 9:  Suppose that () ( 11 ˆˆ ,...,  and  ,..., n ) n p pp p  are two solutions to the differential equation 
system 
  () () () () , , 1,..., ji i i
ji
p bc b h p b i
b ≠
∂ ′ =
∂ ∑ n =  (2.9) 
on the interval ( .  If for some 
12 , bb  ( () ()
12 ˆ ,, ii bb bp bp b  ∈ <  DD D  for all i, then, for all 
,  ()
1, bb b ∈ D
   () () ˆ for all  , ii p bp b < i  (2.10) 
and 








′ > ∑∑ b ′  (2.11) 
  12Proof:  Dividing both sides of (2.11) by n-1 and then summing over i, we obtain 
 











b ∑∑ . (2.12) 
 
Subtracting (2.9) from (2.12), we have for all i, 
 




ij j j i i
ji
pb cb h pb n cb hpb
nb b ≠
 ∂ ∂ ′ =− − 
−∂ ∂  ∑ ) i
)
. (2.13) 
  Suppose, contrary to (2.10), there exist i and   such that  (
1, bb b ∈ D () () ˆ ii p bp b = .  Let   
be the biggest such b.  Then 
ˆ b
  () () ˆ ˆ ii ˆ p bp b =  (2.14) 
and 
  () () ˆ jj p bp b <  (2.15) 
for all bb  and  ( ˆ,b ∈ D) 1,..., j n = . 
  Now, from the fundamental theorem for ordinary differential equations (FTODE), there 
exists a unique solution () 1,..., n p p  to (2.9) with the point condition  () () ˆ
jj ˆ p bp b =  for all j.  
Hence, from (2.14) and (2.15), there exists   such that   k ≠ i
  () () ˆ ˆ kk ˆ p bp b < . (2.16) 
From (2.13) and (2.14) 
 
  () () () () ( ) () () ( ) ()
1 ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆˆ ˆˆ ,,
1
ii j j j j j j
ji
pb pb cb h pb cb h pb
nb ≠
∂ ′′ −= −
−∂ ∑ . (2.17) 
  13But from (2.15) and (2.16) and Assumption 2, the right-hand side of (2.17) is positive and hence 
() () ˆ ii p bp b >  for b in a right neighborhood of b , contradicting (2.15).  We conclude that (2.10) 
holds as claimed.  Then (2.11) follows from (2.10), (2.12), and Assumption 2. 
ˆ
                                                                                                                                Q.E.D. 
3. UNIQUENESS 
  When buyers are ex ante asymmetric, we do not generally obtain uniqueness of 
equilibrium bids that win zero probability.  To see this, consider the following: 
Example:  Suppose that n  is distributed uniformly in the interval [0,1], and that  is 
distributed uniformly in [3,4].
1 2, that  = s 2 s
1
5  One equilibrium consists of buyer 2 bidding   for all   
and bs  for all  .  However, we can replace buyer 1’s bid function with bs  
without destroying equilibrium.  Indeed, there is a continuum of different possible equilibrium 
bids for buyer 1.  Nevertheless, all this multiplicity occurs below  , and thus pertains only to 
bids that have no chance of winning. 
() 22 1 bs=
() 11 ˆ =
2 s
() 11 1 s = 1 s
2 s
1 b∗ =
  Such examples dictate that when we speak of “uniqueness of equilibrium” we will 
henceforth be referring only to the portions of the equilibrium bid functions at or above b .  ∗
Proposition 1:  Suppose that    If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then equilibrium is unique.  2. n =
Proof:  Recall from Lemma 3 that  2 . sbs ∗ ≤≤ 1   Suppose first that  2 bs ∗ ≥ .  But then, from Lemma 
3,  2 bs ∗ = , and buyer 1 with reservation price  1 s  maximizes his payoff by bidding  2. s   Clearly 
the same is true for all other types of buyer 1, and so  () 11 2 s = bs  for all  , i.e., equilibrium is 
unique at or above b . 
1 s
*
                                                           
5 Strictly speaking, this example violates our assumption that  ()0 i i Fs > , but we could modify it 
slightly to satisfy the assumption without changing our conclusion. 
  14  Thus, suppose that  2 bs ∗ < . Then, from Lemma 1, for any equilibrium there exists   






∗      with continuous c.d.f.G .  
From Lemma 4, both bidders bid with strictly positive probability in any subinterval of ( .  
Hence, from Lemma 8, if   is an equilibrium, the transforms (




( 12 , bb  ) ) 12 , p p  of the inverse bid 
functions ( 12 , ) φφ  are differentiable everywhere and satisfy the differential equation system (2.9). 
  Now suppose that there exist equilibria () 12 , p p  and () 12 ˆˆ , p p  such that the support of the 
former is  , bb
∗
∗     and that of the latter is  ˆ , bb
∗
∗  
  , where  ˆ bb
∗ ∗ > .  Then, for i   1,2, =
  () () () ˆ ˆ 1 iii ˆ p bp bp b
∗∗ ==>
∗ . (3.1) 
 
Because both equilibria satisfy (2.9) on the interval ( , Lemma 9 and (3.1) imply that, for 







∗  ∈ 







′ > ∑∑ b ′ . (3.2) 
 
Integrating (3.2) and using the fact that  j p  and  ˆ j p  are continuous at b , we obtain  ∗
 
  () () () () () (
22
11
ˆˆ ˆˆ jj jj




−≥ − ∑∑ ∗ . (3.3) 
Hence, from (3.1) and (3.3), we have 





j p bp ∗
==
> ∑∑ b ∗ . (3.4) 
  15But from Lemma 3,  () () () 1 11 1 ˆ log p bp b F s ∗∗ ==  and  () () () 22 2 ˆ log p bp b F b ∗∗ == ∗ , which  
contradicts (3.4).  We conclude that  ˆ bbb
∗∗ ==
()1 ==
∗ , and so uniqueness follows from FTODE with 
boundary condition   .  () 12 pb pb
∗∗
  Q.E.D. 
The proof of Proposition 1 applies the FTODE to the upper endpoint of the distribution of 
winning bids.  With two buyers, the upper endpoint is the same for both buyers, but with three or 
more buyers, not everyone need share the same maximum bid.  To guarantee that they do, we 
shall impose two more fairly mild assumptions: 
Assumption 3:  Equal upper endpoints. 
The upper endpoint of the support of the distribution of reservation prices is the same for all 
buyers, i.e.,  1 ... n ss === s
j
                                                          
6 
  
We also assume that when bidders have the same reservation price, then they have the same 
preferences.  Formally, we have: 
Assumption 4:  Identical reservation prices imply identical preferences 
For all i and j, if  , then Us .  i ss = () () ,, ii j j Us ⋅= ⋅
 
Note that Assumption 4 is satisfied if buyers are risk neutral, as is often assumed in the auctions 




6 Assumption 3 is weak in the sense that, for any vector of distributions ( , there exists another 
vector (  that is arbitrarily close to   and satisfies the assumption.  Moreover our 
method of proof can be extended readily to the case of different upper endpoints. 
1,..., n FF
1 ˆˆ ,..., n FF ( 1,..., n FF
  16Lemma 10:  If Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, then the upper endpoints in the supports of all buyers’ 
equilibrium bid distributions are the same. 
 
Proof:   Suppose that we index the buyers according to the upper endpoints of their equilibrium 
bid distributions:  .  Since equilibrium bidding is monotonic,   is a best reply for 
bidder 1 when his type is 





s (by leaving the subscript off s , we are invoking Assumption 3).  
Using the logarithmic transformation of buyer 1's expected utility, it follows that  
 
  11 1
22




ebs pb c bs pb c bs c bs ebs
∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
==
=− ≤−= − = ∑∑ 1 1 1
∗ , 
 




()0 () nn n
j = , and we have invoked Assumption 4 
by leaving the subscript off  .  Suppose that b  . Since   is in the support of buyer 1's 
distribution of winning bids, 
1 c 1 b
∗
1 p bp b
∗ ∗ <= .  Substituting for  ( ) nn p b







(,) () (,) (,) (,)
n
nn jn n n
j




=− < − = ∑
∗ . 
 





           Q . E . D .  
 
  The proof of Proposition 1 also relies on the property that, with just two buyers, 
equilibrium bid functions are continuous above b .  But with three or more buyers, our 
assumptions so far do not suffice to rule out the possibility that some buyer i has a "gap" [  
∗
, ] bb ′ ′ ′
  17in the support of his equilibrium bid distribution.  Still, we require only one additional weak 
condition to rule out such gaps: 
 
Assumption 5: Nonincreasing absolute risk-aversion 











i , is nonnegative and 
nonincreasing in  .  i s
 
We can now establish our final preliminary result: 
Lemma 11: If Assumptions 1, 2, 4, and 5 hold, the support of each buyer i’s equilibrium bid 
distribution is an interval [, .     1 ] bb
∗
∗
Remark:  We ignore bids that have no chance of winning for the reasons illustrated by the 
example at the beginning of the section.   
Proof:  Suppose, to the contrary, that some buyer i's equilibrium bid distribution has a "gap" 
.  That is, there exists some reservation price   for which both b  and 











b ()  for all  ii bs b φ   ∈ =  
D D D D
D
.  Buyer i with reservation price   
chooses b to maximize 
i s
D






Thus, at  ,  b
D









DD ≤ .   
 
Let b  be the biggest bid in [ such that   ˆ , ] bb
DD D
  18 









D 0 i ≤


         (3.6) 
 
for all bb .  Suppose that m of the equilibrium bid functions are strictly increasing at b .  
Without loss of generality, let these be the bid functions of bidders 1 to m and suppose that they 
are increasing throughout the interval 
ˆ ,b  ∈ 
D D
ˆ , bb  
 
D  (if not, we can conduct the following argument on 
each subinterval of strictly increasing bid functions).  Then, from (3.6), 
 












∂ ∂ ′ =−
∂∂ ∑ 0 ≤ ,        ( 3 . 7 )  
 
and from (2.6), 
  () ()
1












∂ ′ − = =
∂ ∑ m .        ( 3.8) 
 
Comparing (3.7) with (3.8), we obtain 









.        ( 3 . 9 )  
Hence, from Assumptions 2 and 4, 
 ( ) ( ), 1,..., ik bb k φφ <=  for all bb ˆ ,b   ∈  
D .       ( 3 . 1 0 )  
 
Summing (3.8) over , we have  k
  19  () (
11











∂ ∑∑ ) j b .         ( 3 . 1 1 )  














∂∂ ′′ −< = +


















j <+,      ( 3 . 1 2 )  
where the last inequality follows from Assumptions 4 and 5 and (3.10), and where the fact that 
() j p b is twice differentiable at b follows from our assumptions about   and the FTODE.  j F
From  (3.7) and (3.11), 
 
() () () () () (
1
1













∂− ∂ ∂ ∑ ) ] i φ . (3.13) 
 




































































[( 1 ) ] [ ( ) ( 1 ) (






mbb m b ==
∂∂ ∂∂
<− − + − −
















bm b b =
∂ ∂∂
− −
∂− ∂ ∂ ∑
2 ] m <+ (from (3.13).  (3.14) 




























∂  ∂∂  −− ≤   ∂∂ ∂   ∑ , 
and so, from (3.9), the bracketed expression on the right-hand side of (3.14) is negative.  Thus, 

















It follows that bband so   is strictly decreasing over [ , a contradiction of our 
hypothesis that bidder i with reservation price  is indifferent between bidding   and b .  Thus 
there can be no such "gap" after all. 
ˆ , =
DD ( , ) ii ebs





           Q . E . D .  
Proposition 2:  Uniqueness with n buyers 
If Assumptions 1-5 hold, equilibrium is unique. 
Proof:  Lemmas 8 and 11 imply that equilibrium inverse bid functions are differentiable, and 
Lemma 10 implies that, in equilibrium, each buyer makes the same maximum bid.  Hence, we 
can apply Lemma 9, as in the proof of Proposition 1, to show that the maximum bid b  is the 
same in any equilibrium.  Uniqueness then follows from FTODE. 
∗
           Q . E . D .  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
  We have limited our attention to the case of “independent private values,” in which a 
buyer’s reservation price does not depend on other buyers’ private information, and reservation 
  21prices are independently distributed.  Note that, for this case, our arguments also establish 
equilibrium existence without the need to invoke existence theorems for discontinuous games 
such as Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Simon and Zame (1990), and Reny (1999) (existence 
results for high-bid auctions that do use these theorems include Lebrun (1996), Maskin and Riley 
(2000b), Bresky (1999), Jackson and Swinkels (2001), and Reny and Zamir (2002)). 
  When there are only two buyers, Lizzeri and Persico (2000) relax the independence and 
private-values assumptions and establish uniqueness (and existence) under affiliation and certain 
forms of interdependent values.  We believe that our methods can be adapted to accommodate 
such relaxations when there are more than two buyers, but this avenue remains to be explored 
(Bajari, 2001, establishes uniqueness when there are more than two buyers under the assumption 
the inverse bid functions are everywhere differentiable). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Lemma 5:  Strict monotonicity property of bid distributions. 
For any b  and any i,   b ∗ > ( ) j
ji
p b
≠ ∑  is strictly increasing at b. 
  
Proof:  Choose  .  From Lemma 4, there must be at least one buyer  who bids in  0 ε > k ≠ i




−< b ∑ ∑ . 
                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 6:  If   ( ) i b φ  is strictly increasing to the right (or left) at  bb ,  then     is a best 
response for buyer i with reservation price  .  
ˆ b ∗ =≥ ˆ b
ˆ ˆ () ii sb φ =
 
Proof:  Since both cases are handled in the same way, we consider only the case in which  ( ) i b φ  
is strictly increasing to the right.  If   ( ) i b φ  is also strictly increasing to the left, then 
, and so the Lemma follows.  Thus for some  ,  suppose that   for all 
.  That is, for some bb .  Because  
ˆ () () ii by b φ =







* () i bs φ = i
* ˆˆ ] , ( ) i b y b = [, δ ∈− ( ) i b φ  is strictly increasing 
to the right at b ,  there exists a decreasing sequence { converging to  b  such that 











Since   is optimal for reservation price  ,  we have 
t b ( )
t
i yb
  25        e  (A.1)  ( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( )), for all .
tt t tt
ii j ii j ii
ji ji
byb pb cbyb pb cb yb t
∗∗ ∗
≠≠
=− ≥ − ∑∑







∑  is continuous.  Also    is continuous.  
Therefore we have, in the limit, 
( , ) ii cb s
 
     
** ˆˆ () (, ) ( ) ( , ) ji i j i
ji ji
p bc b s p b c b s
≠≠
−≥ − ∑∑.       ( A . 2 )  
 
From (A.2) it follows that buyer i with reservation price    is at least as well off choosing   as 
. 
*
i s ˆ b
* b
                                                                                                                             Q.E.D. 
 




≠ ∑   is correspondingly right (or left) continuously differentiable at b .  Moreover, the 
right (left) derivative satisfies 
ˆ











∂ ∑ b .         ( A . 3 )  
 
Proof:  Since the two cases are handled in the same way, we consider only the case in which  
() i b φ   is strictly increasing to the right.  We know that   ( ) i b φ  is continuous.  Thus at b  there   ˆ
  26exists a decreasing sequence  {  converging to   such that  converges to 
  monotonically from above.  Because b is optimal for buyer i with reservation price 
 we have 
1,..., ,...}
t bb ˆ b ( )
t
i yb
* ˆ () ii s φ =
(
t






  ˆˆ () (, ( ) ) ( ) ( , ( ) )
tt t
ji i j i i
ji ji
p bc b y b p b c b y b
≠≠
−≤ − ∑∑. 
Rearranging, we obtain 
 
ˆ ˆ () ( ) (,() ) ( ,() )
ˆˆ
t tt t
jj ii i i
tt
ji




−− ∑ .     (A.4)   
By Lemma 6,  b   is optimal for buyer i with reservation price   . Thus,  ˆ ˆ () i b φ
  ˆˆ ˆ () (, () ) ( ) ( , () )
tt
ji i j i i
ji ji
ˆ p bc b b p b c b b φφ
≠≠
−≥ − ∑∑  for all t. 
 
Rearranging, we obtain 
 
ˆ ˆˆ () ( ) (,( ) ) ( ,( ) )
ˆˆ
t t
jj ii i i
tt
ji









.     (A.5) 
 




∂ ) , which is 
continuous in b .  Thus  ˆ ( ) j
ji
p b
≠ ∑  is right  continuously differentiable at  b , and its right 
derivative satisfies (A.3). 
ˆ
                                                                                                                   Q.E.D. 
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Lemma 8: ( ) i b φ   is right (left) continuously differentiable at all  b .  * b >
Proof:  Suppose   1( ),..., ( ) k bb φ φ  are strictly increasing to the right at    and that   ˆ b 1( ),..., ( ) kn bb φφ +  




≠ ∑  is right 















− ∑∑ ∑ b  
is also right differentiable at  .  Since the difference between these last two expressions is just  ˆ b
( ), 1,..., i p bi k = , this too is right differentiable at  .  But  ˆ b ( ) ( ( )) ii i p bF b φ = .  Thus  ( ) i b φ  is right 
differentiable at b .  ˆ
                                                                                                                             Q.E.D. 
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Figure 1.1:  Single-crossing property 
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